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The rare and the common: scale and the genetic imaginary
in Alzheimer’s disease drug development
Richard Milne *
Wellcome Genome Campus – Society and Ethics Research Group, Cambridge, UK;
Institute of Public Health, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
In this paper I examine how the promissory value of genetics is constituted
through processes of scale and scaling, focussing on the relationship between
“rare” and “common” forms of disease. I highlight the bodies and spaces
involved in the production of post-genomic knowledge and technologies of
Alzheimer’s disease and the development of new disease-modifying drugs. I
focus on the example of the development of a monoclonal antibody therapy
for Alzheimer’s disease. I argue that the process of therapeutic innovation,
from genetic studies and animal models to phase III clinical trials, reﬂects
the persistent importance of a genetic imaginary and a mutually constitutive
relationship between the rare and the common in in shaping visions of
Alzheimer’s disease medicine. Approaching this relationship as a question of
scale, I suggest the importance of attending to how and where genomic
knowledge is “scaled” or proves resistant to scaling.
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Scale and the promise of genomic medicine
In Alzheimer’s disease as elsewhere, realizing the therapeutic contribution of post-
genomic knowledge has been conceptualized as a problem of “translation.” This
involves a bumpy and oft-thwarted movement along a fundamentally linear trajec-
tory between “bench and bedside” (Harrington and Hauskeller 2014; Latimer
2013). However, translation is also fundamentally a question of the ability to
scale. Take, for example, Bill Clinton’s famous comments at the completion of
the Human Genome Project, which emphasized how “In coming years, doctors
increasingly will be able to cure diseases like Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, diabetes
and cancer by attacking their genetic roots” (Clinton 2000). Such interventions
establish hierarchies which link societal health challenges to molecular “roots,”
reﬂecting and reinforce material and functional connections between genes and
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populations. The politics of scale is thus central to “big biology” (Davies, Frow, and
Leonelli 2013), and the process of switching scales, and the forms of knowledge,
power and value associated with this a key site of empirical analysis.
In this paper I examine the role of scale and the challenges of scaling in establish-
ing the promissory value of genetics. I focus on how the relationship between the
bodies and spaces associated with “rare” and “common” forms of disease is estab-
lished and conﬁgured through the development of new drugs. Focussing on the
case of solanezumab, a candidate monoclonal antibody therapy for Alzheimer’s
disease, I highlight how the interaction and calibration of the rare and the
common supports the continuing importance of a genetic imaginary in drug devel-
opment in AD.
Background
Alzheimer’s disease has, throughout its history, been an unstable category, and the
relationship between dementia and biological change continually contested (Ballen-
ger 2006; Lock 2013). At the heart of these debates has been the question of whether
“diseases of old age” can be distinguished and treated separately, or whether they
represent, and should be managed as, “normal ageing” (Moreira 2017). However,
less considered is the relationship between early-onset forms of Alzheimer’s
disease, which are often familial and genetically inherited and the sporadic, late-
onset forms. Focussing on this relationship provides a means of outlining important
dynamics in the pursuit of novel treatments for Alzheimer’s disease, and contribut-
ing to wider discussions about the role of genetics in post-genomic biomedicine.
In the early 1990s, Lippman proposed what has become the classic version of the
geneticization thesis – that genetic explanations would come to dominate how
societies understand health, illness and social problems (Lippman 1992).
Drawing on earlier critiques of medicalization, she critiqued the role of molecular
genetics and its institutional and commercial forms in fostering reductionist
approaches which obscured complex social and biological processes. Geneticiza-
tion in this form was, Lippman argued, a process of “colonization” (1992, 1474)
explicitly linked to corporate interests.
Geneticization has been the focus of much research interest and debate (Hall
2003; Hedgecoe 2001; Kerr 2000; Shostak, Conrad, and Horwitz 2008; Weiner
and Martin 2008; Will, Armstrong, and Marteau 2010). Reﬂecting on this work,
Weiner et al. (2017) argue that few initial concerns about geneticization have
been realized. They suggest that even for those conditions understood as genetic,
genetic knowledge is not privileged over other clinical information. Lock uses Alz-
heimer’s disease to demonstrate this point, arguing that even when a gene is incon-
trovertibly associated with susceptibility to a disease – in this case the ApoE E4
allele – it does not follow that a genetic mode of interpretation will become domi-
nant across the sites where the condition is investigated, treated, or managed (Lock
2013; Lock, Lloyd, and Prest 2006).
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Lock’s analysis of Alzheimer’s disease is indicative of an emerging “postge-
nomic consensus” (Navon and Eyal 2016, 1417) which has in turn challenged soci-
ologists to innovate in their understanding of the social consequences of genetic
science. Increasing complexity and dynamism in scientiﬁc accounts of disease
have been accompanied by more nuanced social scientiﬁc work which captures
relationships between bioscientiﬁc, clinical and lay understandings of health,
illness and heredity (Arribas-Ayllon, Bartlett, and Featherstone 2010; Weiner and
Martin 2008; Will, Armstrong, and Marteau 2010).
Three themes in this recent work have importance for the current discussion.
First, while early critical work on genetics presupposed a linear trajectory from
science to clinic and society, there is increased recognition of complexity and the
non-linearity of socio-technical change. Shostak, Conrad, and Horwitz (2008)
argue that relations between genetics research, geneticization and medicalization
are “path-dependent.” Drawing on the examples of depression, homosexuality
and chemical exposure, they argue that longer-term socio-technical histories and
decisions made at critical junctures within these establish enduring institutional
and structural patterns of classiﬁcation and categorization. For example, they
suggest that the attribution of genetic causes to depression is the result of “cultural
deﬁnitions, institutional forces, and political and economic interests that arose
decades ago” (2008, S304). In contrast to homosexuality then, the geneticization
and medicalization of depression are rendered possible by the prior location of
the phenotype within the “jurisdiction” (2008, S304) of medicine.
These socio-technical legacies and paths of classiﬁcation are important in con-
sidering what Weiner et al. describe as the persistence of a “genetic imaginary,”
rooted in a fundamentally biological understanding of disease and the promise
that “[b]y understanding the molecular basis of disease we can create a new kind
of medicine.” (2017, 999). While this imaginary, they suggest, is continually
remade and rearticulated, it retains a power and attraction aligned with a contem-
porary focus on pharmaceutical solutions to illness, and, we might expand, the
“biomarkerization” (Metzler 2010) of disease. Weiner et al. suggest that this
genetic imaginary is expressed in a new wave of novel biotechnologies, including
gene editing, whole genome sequencing and biological drugs.
Recent work has explored the relationship between the “rare” and the “common”
proposed within imaginaries of genomic promise. This work shows how genetic
explanations fail to gain traction (Will, Armstrong, and Marteau 2010) or, follow-
ing Mol (2003), how they contribute to elaborating the ontological multiplicity of
conditions such as coronary heart disease (Weiner and Martin 2008). Work by
Navon and Eyal (2016) on autism, however, suggests an unfolding historical
relationship through which categories such as “rare” and “common” conditions
emerge. Drawing on Hacking’s (2007) description of the “looping effects” of
social categories, Navon and Eyal describe how genetic evidence helped bring
together the diagnostic scope of autism with rare forms of developmental disorder
not previously understood as associated with the condition. Subsequently, this
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extension to new domains of application spurred further reﬁnement and elaboration
of diagnostic criteria themselves.
In sum, recent work on geneticization suggests complex relations between
genetic, social and clinical contexts across which hopes and fears about genetic
knowledge and value are realized. Assemblages (Arribas-Ayllon 2016) of
genomic promise emphasize complexity and contingency. They also draw attention
to the interaction between both the sites of genomic knowledge, such as the lab and
the clinic, but also its scales.
Scale is a long-standing concern of work in the “sociology of translation,”
notably the relations between the “big” and “small” worlds (Callon, Lascoumes,
and Barthe 2009) and the processes through which size and scale are produced
(Callon and Latour 1981). This work emphasizes that scales at which and about
which knowledge is produced do not pre-exist translation, but rather are precarious
achievements brought into being through processes and practices of “scaling”
(Davies, Frow, and Leonelli 2013; Latour 2013). These processes involve “nego-
tiations, intrigues, calculations. acts of persuasion and violence” which enable
some actors to speak or act in the place of others (Callon and Latour 1981, 279)
and which form the “glue” in chains of translation (Williams-Jones and Graham
2003, 275).
Understood in these terms, the relationship between the rare and the common is
not simply a relationship between existing categories, but one between two scales
which are emergent within a speciﬁc moment in the history of Alzheimer’s disease.
They are stabilized and brought into relation by processes of translation. Further,
the capacity to relate scales or move between them is the key operation in the
assembly of actor-networks (Latour 2013). Extending the point in her analysis of
contemporary capitalism, Tsing suggests that the ability to change scales is the hall-
mark of modern knowledge and of understandings of progress (Tsing 2012).
Work on the role of animal models in biological research provides an illustration
of how scales are produced and brought into relation in the production of post-
genomic knowledge. Animal models enable complex phenomena to become tract-
able scientiﬁc objects, simplifying and standardizing the phenomenon under study
(Lewis et al. 2013). In doing so they transform the topology of disease, providing
simpliﬁed and standardized biological forms for the production of knowledge
which can be transferred between species or scientiﬁc ﬁelds (cf Ankeny and Leo-
nelli 2011), and its topography, as standardized “bio-objects” which are themselves
circulated within scientiﬁc networks of exchange (Davies and Rosengarten 2012;
Eriksson 2012; Milne 2016). In the process of reducing biological scale, they are
thus able to expand the scope of scientiﬁc investigation. Thus Davies, in a discus-
sion of the commodiﬁed mouse model describes how animals are brought into both
“intimate geographies of corporeal equivalence with humans, and expansive geo-
graphies of global translational research” (2012, 126).
The ability of topologies of equivalence to support a global system of research
makes them an obligatory passage point in the realization of the “genetic
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imaginary.” They allow the transfer of knowledge generated in one context or
organism to another. Models support the ability of research questions to shift
between scales, from the molecular to the population, and facilitate the relations
of equivalence and exchange integral to the production of genomic value.
However, as Latour and Tsing point out, scaling requires effort, not least when
impediments are encountered. Such impediments are familiar features of discus-
sions of the translational role of animal models and the scales between which
they mediate. Models’ ability to work across scales requires signiﬁcant and
ongoing work. This is characterized by “constant iteration and transformation”
(Davies and Rosengarten 2012, 132) between model organisms and the phenomena
they purport to model (Huber and Keuck 2013; Lewis et al. 2013; Nelson 2018).
Lewis and colleagues (2013) elaborate on this in discussing the use of animal
models in practice in the neuroscience laboratory. The inaccessibility of the work-
ings of the brain poses a challenge for neurological modeling, forming an “episte-
mic void” (Nelson 2018, 12) around which knowledge is constructed. Drawing on
ethnographic work across laboratory sites, Lewis and colleagues examine how
models come to be considered as “good enough” to speak for the phenomenon
they represent. They show how models operate in two directions, such that:
[S]cientists calibrate animals against the medical phenomena which they are intended
to represent. In turn, human medical conditions and the patients who manifest them
have to be calibrated against the rodent models. (Lewis et al. 2013, 776)
Their notion of “calibration” emphasizes the reciprocal material transformations
that occur in the process of establishing relations of similarity or equivalence
across scales, and provides a productive resource for thinking about the interactions
between the rare and the common in the pursuit of therapies for Alzheimer’s
disease.
In the remainder of this paper, I develop on this work to consider the iterative
relationship between the rare and the common in Alzheimer’s disease. I ﬁrst set
out the historical relationship between familial and sporadic forms of Alzheimer’s
disease, and the role of changing diagnostic criteria in establishing these as distinct
but related entities. I then examine the role of genetic forms of disease in shaping
understandings of Alzheimer’s disease in the 1980s, and the translation of human
genetic information into mouse models. I address the work involved in scaling Alz-
heimer’s disease, and highlight the impediments which emerge and which prompt
the recalibration of the rare and the common.
Methods
The paper draws on two sources. The ﬁrst is the genealogical tracing of the
materials of Alzheimer’s drug development – speciﬁcally solanezumab, and the
models, bodies and knowledges with which it is entangled – through the research
and gray literature, conference proceedings and transcripts, patents and popular
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publications. This starts from the unsuccessful EXPEDITION3 trial described
above, and works back to the early 1980s, through the ﬁrst publications of precli-
nical studies, the development of the models in which these were conducted and
foundational work in the molecular biology of Alzheimer’s disease. I then retraced
the story of the molecule that became solanezumab to the present to examine
where, how and by whom connections are made between models, materials and
populations. Papers were identiﬁed through co-authorship and citation patterns,
but primarily by following the materials and models involved in the drug develop-
ment process. In this approach, the scientiﬁc literature and associated commentary
are treated as “informants,” in which the nature of life is depicted, emplotted and
problematized (Kelty and Landecker 2009). In this sense, scientiﬁc papers, and
their discussions of materials and methods serve to describe experiments, to
make an argument for the basis for claims and orient the ﬁeld around particular con-
cerns or approaches to their resolution.
The second empirical source is ethnographic ﬁeldnotes from observation at Alz-
heimer’s disease research conferences. These include the Clinical Trials in Alzhei-
mer’s Disease conference (CTAD), in San Diego in December 2016, and the
Alzheimer’s Association International Conference (AAIC) in London in July
2017. These are two of the major annual events in Alzheimer’s disease research
and drug development. Conferences are important sites for the study of science.
They represent the history and future of disciplines are enacted, remembered and
planned (González-Santos and Dimond 2015). However, conferences serve differ-
ent purposes for different audiences. The two conferences focussed on here are
oriented towards audiences which are complementary but not entirely overlapping.
CTAD is a US-European initiative established in 2009. The conference has around
1000 attendees, and sits at the intersection between academic research and indus-
trial drug development, with a focus on new clinical trials and trial methods.
Plenary and parallel sessions in the conference halls are complemented by a
panoply of small closed meetings, at which large and small companies interact
with academic scientiﬁc and medical advisors and those who run their trials at
public and private sector clinics. AAIC is the largest conference in Alzheimer’s
disease research, with around 6000 attendees. Organized and managed by the
US-based Alzheimer’s Association since 2000, the conference is also primarily
focussed on biomedical science and clinical applications, but with a wider scope.
Again, there is a large biopharmaceutical industry presence, with smaller meetings
supplemented by an exhibition hall of company booths and corporate-sponsored
satellite events.
There is no standardized approach to the study of conferences (González-Santos
and Dimond 2015). The evidence presented in the current paper takes the form of
statements made in highly public forums – and, in the case of CTAD, also webcast
on the conference website. Analysis of these public statements was informed by
informal conference conversations with researchers from private and public
sector institutions. These are not presented verbatim, but provided important
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context for understanding the development of Alzheimer’s research. Formal inter-
views were also conducted with academic and industry representatives, for which
informed consent was sought. This work was reviewed by the University of Cam-
bridge Humanities and Social Sciences ethics committee.
Scaling Alzheimer’s disease
The following sections describe the evolving relationship between the rare and the
common in the quest for new drugs for Alzheimer’s disease. I start with a discus-
sion of the unsuccessful Phase III clinical trial of solanezumab in 2016, and its role
in consolidating the molecular redeﬁnition of Alzheimer’s disease. I position this in
the longer-term evolution of the Alzheimer’s diagnosis and the growing emphasis
on biomarkers and complexity in Alzheimer’s disease research. I then consider the
role of molecular genetic research and animal models in supporting the promise of
biomarkers, and in “recalibrating” the relationship between animal models, rare
diseases and common, late-onset forms of Alzheimer’s disease.
Doing “real” clinical trials
At the Clinical Trials in Alzheimer’s Disease conference in San Diego in December
2016, a panel of experts from academia, industry and patients’ organizations con-
vened to discuss the meaning and implications of Eli Lilly’s EXPEDITION3 trial of
the monoclonal antibody drug solanezumab. The summary results of the study had
been released two weeks earlier, revealing that the drug did not meet its primary
endpoint – a statistically signiﬁcant change in cognitive decline in people with
mild dementia. The CTAD panel, however, provided the forum for the full
release of the results by lead investigator Lawrence Honig. It drew a capacity audi-
ence to the 2000-seat hotel ballroom venue, a level of interest reﬂecting the animat-
ing absence of the “cure” in Alzheimer’s disease research.
Solanezumab is a potentially “disease-modifying” drug for Alzheimer’s disease,
one that affects the progression of disease to slow or prevent further cognitive
decline. Like most drugs under development, solanezumab focuses on one pro-
posed mechanism of disease aetiology, known as the amyloid cascade hypothesis
(Cummings et al. 2016). The focus of research since the 1990s, such drugs
differ from available pharmacological treatments which alleviate symptoms by
boosting levels of neurotransmitters. Modifying disease course has become the
central quest of biomedical research into Alzheimer’s disease. It has, to date,
been quixotic. As a commentary in the BMJ concluded, solanezumab’s lack of
success was not a surprise, as “Alzheimer’s disease is the graveyard of drug discov-
ery” (Hawkes 2016, i6389).
However, EXPEDITION3 was novel not only in terms of the drug, but the popu-
lation upon whom it was tested. It was the ﬁrst major trial to shift the ground for
inclusion from the cognitive to the biological. In addition to meeting clinical
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diagnostic criteria, all those who took part in the trial had to be “positive” for beta-
amyloid protein, a biomarker assessed through imaging with the radiotracer ﬂorbe-
tapir (known as Amyvid, and also owned by Eli Lilly), or by levels of beta-amyloid
in cerebrospinal ﬂuid taken by lumbar puncture. Neurologist Bruno Vellas, co-chair
of the CTAD conference, suggested that this fact made the EXPEDITION3 trial
qualitatively different from all the previous efforts of the ﬁeld, as the ﬁrst
“real trial with Alzheimer’s disease patients” (author notes). Maria Carrillo, the
chief scientiﬁc ofﬁcer of the Alzheimer Association, described the trial “as [the]
ﬁrst of the next generation of smart Alzheimer trials,” the “ﬁrst one in which
everyone is positive for and screened for the protein that you’re trying to treat”
(author notes).
Vellas and Carrillo’s commentaries reﬂect an importance shift in biomedical
approaches to Alzheimer’s disease, and the place of solanezumab within this. As
Greene describes, “pharmaceuticals have become central agents in the deﬁnition
of disease categories” (2007, 225). The presentation of EXPEDITION3 and the
elaboration of “real trials” in Alzheimer’s disease draws attention to the central
role of biomarkers in contemporary Alzheimer’s disease research and in the emer-
ging “proto-platform” (Gardner 2017) of practices and technologies associated
with the deﬁnition, diagnosis and treatment of the condition. Carrillo’s reference
to the “protein that you’re trying to treat” highlights the importance of beta-
amyloid as more than a biomarker. As I explore in subsequent sections, since the
1980s beta-amyloid has been considered by many as a key component of Alzhei-
mer’s disease pathogenesis, but remains a site of considerable contestation.
Scaling Alzheimer’s disease
The disease described by Alois Alzheimer in 1907, as a pre-senile form of dementia
characterized by neuropathological evidence of “plaques,” “tangles” and the loss of
neurons, was formally held separate from common “senility” until the 1950s. His-
torian Jesse Ballenger suggests that this distinction reﬂected the general lack of
interest and low stakes in an underdeveloped clinical ﬁeld, and that, while Alzhei-
mer’s disease was “ofﬁcially” a rare form of pre-senile dementia, “every researcher
of this period seriously engaged in the study of dementia was aware that Alzhei-
mer’s disease and senile dementia were for all practical purposes the same
entity.” (Ballenger 2006, 46).
From the 1970s, this practical classiﬁcation was formalized as Alzheimer’s came
to be understood as a common and leading cause of illness and death. This was
facilitated by an assemblage of techniques of electron microscopy, clinical reclas-
siﬁcation and an emergent social movement which engaged political interest in dis-
eases of ageing, drawing together familial and late-onset disease (Ballenger 2006;
Fox 1989). One of the architects of this shift, National Institute of Aging director
Robert Katzman, reﬂected later that the goals of a pivotal 1977 research meeting
had been to change the scale of both the research effort and of the disease itself:
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[t]o reach consensus that Alzheimer disease (AD) was not just a relatively rare neu-
rodegenerative disorder of the presenium, but was the major cause of dementia in the
elderly in developed countries. (Katzman and Bick 2000, xi)
The scaling of disease spurred the elaboration of theﬁrst diagnostic criteria to deﬁne its
bounds. The 1984 NINCDS-ADRDA or McKhann criteria (McKhann et al. 1984)
representedaprovisional stabilizationof knowledge andpracticewhosevaluewaspre-
dicated on its ability to support and incorporate novel clinical and research insights
(Moreira 2017). The criteria set out deﬁnitions for both probable and possible Alzhei-
mer’s disease based on the presence of dementia. However, they failed to address a
central problem of clinical research in Alzheimer’s disease, the heterogeneity of the
patient population. As the US Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment described in 1987:
Diagnostic uncertainty complicates clinical research by mixing patients with different
diagnoses. A drug or diagnostic procedure maybe tested on patients with disparate
diseases. Those with different illnesses or in different stages may respond but be
undetected because they are lost among a large group of patients who show no
effect.… Patient heterogeneity is thus the bane of efﬁcient clinical testing… There
is no clear way around this problem in clinical research on dementia. (OTA 1987, 89)
In the 1990s, criteria for “mild cognitive impairment” (MCI) attempted to provide a
remedy by capturing “subtle” and “early” (Petersen 2004, 183) aspects of a cognitive
transition between normal ageing and dementia, and providing a new “conventional
standard” for the articulation of clinical and research practice (Moreira, May, and
Bond 2009). More recently, a comprehensive revision of diagnostic guidelines was
proposed by the National Institute of Ageing and the Alzheimer Association (NIA-
AA) in 2011 (Lock 2013). These covered clinical applications in dementia
(McKhann et al. 2011) and MCI (Albert et al. 2011), and moved “towards deﬁning
the preclinical stages of Alzheimer’s disease” (Sperling et al. 2011). The NIA-AA cri-
teria suggest a trajectory of cognitive but also biological change, and means of track-
ing individuals along this path, providing more clearly delineated patient populations.
The criteria inform clinical diagnostic practice while supporting the identiﬁcation of
an “early,” non-clinical research population for studies to test the effectiveness of pre-
ventative therapies for AD (Lock 2013; Moreira 2017; Milne 2018). Further, the cri-
teria (and a similar proposal from an International Working Group [Dubois et al.
2007]), introduce biological markers to diagnostic assessment for the ﬁrst time. In
doing so, they act as “trailblazers,” establishing a vector for research and clinical
care which validates biomarkers’ potential for understanding an individual’s relation-
ship with (future) dementia, while also being “gatekeepers,” emphasizing that the
potential of the technology itself has not yet been realized (Boenink 2018).
The ill-charted territory of Alzheimer’s genetics
The introduction of biomarkers to diagnosis reﬂects the growing role of biologi-
cal indicators in the identiﬁcation of Alzheimer’s disease. For Lock (2005), the
drive to biomarkers reﬂects a change in how biomedical research engages with
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the future, prompted by the uncertain predictive value and complexity of Alzhei-
mer’s disease genetics in comparison with single gene disorders. This is reﬂected
in the focus within contemporary Alzheimer’s disease research on the exploration
of susceptibility genes and polygenic risk factors, even the most potent of which
only contribute incrementally to an individual’s lifetime risk of developing
dementia. Further, the clinical introduction of genetic knowledge, notably
within pharmacogenetics, has met signiﬁcant resistance, not least because of
socio-ethical concerns (Hedgecoe 2004).
The recognition of complexity is, of course, not new to post-genomic framings of
Alzheimer’s disease. Pathologist Martin Roth, in his closing summary to the ﬁrst
international symposium on Alzheimer’s disease in 1969, pointed out that, while
there was evidence of a hereditary component to Alzheimer’s disease, “It is
clearly unproﬁtable to think overall in terms of classical Mendelian phenomena,
that is, in terms of major autosomal or sex-linked genes.” (Roth in Wolstenholme
and O’Connor 1970, 301). Instead, he highlighted the “ill-charted territory” of
“polygenetic” hypotheses. While his caution contrasted with the enthusiasm of
others present,1 Roth’s position reﬂected his focus on Alzheimer’s disease as a con-
dition seen and studied in the community, rather than the clinic, and its relationship
with normal ageing, rather than as a homogeneous and clearly deﬁned pathological
entity (Moreira 2017). Between the caution of Roth and post-genomic complexity
lies the experience of the molecular biology heyday in the 1980s and 1990s.
The importance of the rare
Work on Alzheimer’s disease in the late 1970s emphasized neurochemistry, focuss-
ing on deﬁcits of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine and pursuing therapies that par-
alleled the apparent success of levodopa in the treatment of Parkinson’s disease.
Such work derived from the reconceptualization of dementia as a neurological dis-
order, which opened the possibility of a shared epistemic ﬁeld and the transportabil-
ity of knowledge (Moreira 2009). However, with the advent of molecular biological
techniques, broadened diagnostic deﬁnitions, and new organizational structures for
research, alternative epistemic referents came into focus.
Since the 1940s it had been known that people with Down’s syndrome com-
monly developed symptoms of dementia in their 40s, that plaques and tangles
were also found in the brains of those with this dementia, that this may provide
insights into what was then “senile dementia” (Jervis 1948). These pathological
relations of equivalence were translated into the terms of molecular biology as
the amino acid sequence of the “beta-amyloid” protein found in plaques was elabo-
rated (Glenner and Wong 1984). As a neurobiologist involved in neurotransmitter-
focussed work on Alzheimer’s disease in the 1970s later described, the sequencing
of the amyloid protein was a pivotal moment:
From my perspective, the way AD research developed was that there was this whole
“chemistry era,” which really predated me, and then ran through 1983, probably
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1984, and then everything changed with the amyloid sequencing; and the whole ﬁeld
has gone mad since then. (Davies in Katzman and Bick 2000)
The sequencing provided a new form of evidence that the same protein was indeed
found in both the brains of Alzheimer’s disease patients and people with Down’s
syndrome – as authors Glenner and Wong described, they had provided:
[T]he ﬁrst chemical evidence of a relationship between Down’s syndrome and Alz-
heimer’s disease. It suggests that Down’s syndrome may be a predictable model
for Alzheimer’s disease. (1984, 1131)
The establishment of molecular relationships between Alzheimer’s and Down’s
stabilized the value of molecular genetic studies of Alzheimer’s disease, and
created new intersections between the laboratory and the clinic. In the process, it
generated new interest in conditions such as Down’s syndrome, and rare familial
forms of disease as “predictable models” of common disease. Writing in 1988, neu-
ropathologist David Mann pointed out that the existence of equivalence suggested a
population of “immense value” for research:
Younger patients with Down’s syndrome may represent a model for study from which
it may be possible to identify the site and nature of the earliest pathological changes of
Alzheimer’s disease itself. (Mann 1988)
Such models are situated along carefully delineated axes of similarity and differ-
ence, oriented towards a goal of prediction and control in a heterogeneous
research and clinical ﬁeld. The genetic and neuropathological promise associated
with them reinforced the ongoing “quest” (Pollen 1996) to identify genes respon-
sible for Alzheimer’s disease. It resulted in the identiﬁcation of a series of auto-
somal dominant mutations affecting the production or removal of amyloid,
located in the genes presenilin 1 (PSEN1), presenilin 2 (PSEN2) and amyloid
precursor protein (APP). Writing in the early 1990s, neurologist Daniel Pollen
drew attention to the politics of scientiﬁc competition and collaboration associ-
ated with this race, the incorporation of familial knowledge into scientiﬁc data
and the history and traditions and the movements of economic migrants and
scientists in nineteenth and twentieth centuries Europe and North America that
shaped Alzheimer’s genetics research.
Research into the “Alzheimer’s gene” established familial and early-onset Alz-
heimer’s disease as a genetic condition – a distinctive genomic designation
(Navon 2011) applied to the subset identiﬁed in the McKhann criteria, (and later
retrospectively applied to Auguste D, the ﬁrst case described by Alois Alzheimer
[Keuck 2018]). However, as Pollen elaborated, the research was spurred, and
wider interest generated, by the ability of this rare designation to speak to the
common:
[I]n discovering the nature of the genetic defects in the less common early-onset form
of familial Alzheimer’s disease, scientists may perhaps also ﬁnd the clues to the
enigma of the far more frequent late-onset form of the disease which some have
called “the disease of the century.” (Pollen 1996, 15)
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Pollen here draws attention back to the connection between the familial and the fre-
quent and the scalar promise of understanding what Clinton later described as the
“genetic roots” of disease. They highlight the relationship between the “rare” and
the “common” established through work on Down’s syndrome and familial forms
of disease. As a 1993 review put it “although the mutations are rare causes of the
disease, they point to a general mechanism of aetiology and pathogenesis” (Lann-
felt et al. 1993, 207).
From genes to mice
The combination of genetic research, diagnostic reform and social movement
established the existence of two scales of investigation, and the terms of connection
between them. It provided the basis for the emergence of a bioclinical collective
around AD which focussed attention and therapeutic hopes on the “amyloid
cascade hypothesis” (ACH). The ACH was ﬁrst outlined by John Hardy and
David Allsopp, drawing on work led by Alison Goate from Hardy’s group
which had identiﬁed the ﬁrst genetic mutations causing familial Alzheimer’s
disease – a missense mutation in the amyloid precursor protein on chromosome
21 identiﬁed in a UK family (V717I; the “London” mutation). They proposed
that the hypothesis would form the basis for “rational design of drugs to intervene
in this process” (Hardy and Allsop 1991, 383), and made efforts to start the com-
mercialization of the discovery (Bubela, Vishnubhakat, and Cook-Deegan 2015).
The ACH was subsequently re-described and elaborated in a review paper in
Science by John Hardy and Gerald Higgins (1992). It proposed that the accumu-
lation and deposition of beta-amyloid protein initiated a chain of molecular and cel-
lular events resulting in the death of nerve cells and dementia. While the ACH
continues to be contested and controversial (Lock 2013), the paper set it out in
what Hardy later described as a “simple, clear and short” form which “even a
venture capitalist or a corporate CEO can read to the end” (Hardy 2006). Such a
clear, biologically deﬁned trajectory establishing the ability of diagnose, predict
and intervene, presented in an accessible fashion, represent, in many ways, the
ideal – and idealized – output of molecular genetic research.
Hardy and Higgins’ paper represented the combination of two research strands in
molecular biology. Higgins provided supporting evidence for Hardy’s work on the
APP gene in the form of a transgenic mouse model. Higgins and colleagues had
overexpressed human DNA coding for a fragment of the amyloid precursor
protein in the brains of mice. Their research concluded that this single change
could lead to the neuropathological features observed in Alzheimer’s disease. As
Hardy described in 2006:
While I was visiting Gerry’s lab, he and I had got on very well, and he showed me a
manuscript he had in press in Nature, describing the production of transgenic amyloid
mice with fulminant Alzheimer pathology, both plaques and tangles. He offered to
show me slides from the mice, but he couldn’t lay his hands on them at that time.
12 R. Milne
I didn’t mind because looking down a microscope is always a waste of time for me.
However, the manuscript was stunning, and ostensibly described the full modeling of
the disease process. (Hardy 2006, 152)
The mouse model described – published in Nature in 1991 – demonstrated that
mice could mimic the biological changes seen in the brains of people with Alzhei-
mer’s disease, and which, unlike the “models” of trisomy 21 and familial disease,
offered the possibility of experimentation. However, it subsequently became clear
that Higgins’model could not be replicated and that there were signiﬁcant concerns
about the validity of the ﬁndings. The Nature paper was retracted (Marx 1992), and
with it, the initial animal evidence in favor of the hypothesis.
The development of transgenic animals that would offer a “good enough” model
of Alzheimer’s disease in terms of the neuropathological cascade, remained
challenging. Indeed, Lannfelt’s 1993 review, which included Hardy as senior
author, raised the possibility that (in contrast to the human model diseases)
animals may simply be unable to model Alzheimer’s pathology and that while
“[s]uch an assertion is as yet unanswerable” it “will indeed, be the explanation
of choice if transgenic modeling experiments continue to fail.” (Lannfelt et al.
1993, 210).
PDAPP mice
Attaining an appropriate alignment of mouse body and brain was critical to afﬁrm-
ing the amyloid hypothesis, and make it useful to research. The ﬁrst transgenic
animal model of AD was ﬁrst reported in 1995 by the Californian biotech
company Athena Neurosciences, in collaboration with Eli Lilly (Games et al.
1995). The APPV717F mouse, also known as PDAPP, was the ﬁrst transgenic
model to provide a “robust” (Duff 2002) model of Alzheimer’s disease pathology.
PDAPP mice are genetically modiﬁed to reproduce a mutation found in the amyloid
precursor protein (APP) gene in dominantly inherited forms of Alzheimer’s
disease. Speciﬁcally, the mouse models capture the V717F point mutation, a
mutation which occurs at the same molecular site as the London mutation and
was identiﬁed at the Indiana University School of Medicine (and thus termed the
“Indiana” mutation; Murrell et al. 1991).
The development of the PDAPP mice prompted renewed excitement in the
ﬁeld – a commentary (again co-authored by Hardy) described how the transgenic
animals represented both a source of therapeutic promise and stabilized understand-
ings of the disease. It celebrated the availability of “these remarkable animals”
(Duff and Hardy 1995, 476), and presented the mice as a conclusive moment in
the amyloid story:
Workers investigating AD have been sharply divided into two camps: those who
think amyloid deposition is central to the pathological process and those who do
not… The work of Games and colleagues in making a mouse model of the disease
settles this argument, perhaps for good. (Duff and Hardy 1995, 476)
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As well as seemingly settling the biological debate, PDAPP mice reinforced the
economic promise of AD research, as captured in a New York Times’ report
describing the mice as “a rare piece of good news from the beleaguered biotechnol-
ogy industry” (Fisher 1995, 8). Duff and Hardy advocated that “expanding and dis-
tributing colonies of the mice should be a priority” (Duff and Hardy 1995, 476).
However, the challenges of breeding and circulating mouse models, and Athena
and Lilly’s efforts to capture the value from their research meant that the mice
were initially used within those companies for therapeutic screening, before
becoming widely available (Sedlak 1995).
Patents were submitted by Games and Athena to cover the transgenic models and
their use for screening potential therapies, based on their greater similarity to natu-
rally occurring Alzheimer’s disease. Yet, like other models, PDAPP mice are “sim-
ultaneously like and unlike their human counterparts” (Lewis et al. 2013, 778);
while they fail to reproduce aspects of AD pathology, notably the loss of
neurons and neuroﬁbrillary tangles, their ability to show amyloid plaques and suf-
ﬁcient behavioral and biochemical features of the disease positioned them as “good
enough” representations of Alzheimer’s disease. However, such models reify both
behavioral tests and the centrality of genetics to the development of future treat-
ments (cf Davies 2010).
From mice to drugs
The PDAPP model is intimately connected with the humanized monoclonal anti-
body (MAb) therapy solanezumab, which entered development as a result of
research with the mice conducted at Washington University in the 1990s. Mono-
clonal antibodies – standardized biological molecules produced in cell cultures –
are an increasingly important part of both diagnostic and biopharmaceutical
markets (Marks 2015). The research leading to solanezumab focussed on the devel-
opment of a diagnostic test, speciﬁcally the use of murine antibody 266.2 (m266.2)
to assess levels of beta-amyloid. By this point, the PDAPP strain was established as
a widely used research tool, yet even here presented a site of unexpected resistance
– as even within the homozygous PDAPP mice, only half of the mice displayed
high levels of amyloid deposition (DeMattos et al. 2001).
The transformation of m266.2 from diagnostic to therapeutic molecule was
described in the patent application lodged by Washington University and Eli Lilly:
We have now unexpectedly found that administration of the 266 antibody very
quickly and almost completely restores cognition (object memory) in 24-month old
homozygous transgenic mice (APPV717F). (Holtzman, DeMattos, and Bales 2002,
no page)
While the description of surprise also provides narrative support for the claim of an
inventive step worthy of patent protection, the patent describes the unexpected
ﬁnding that antibody m266 did not simply attach to beta-amyloid, but drew it
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out from the brain, preventing toxic plaques forming and crucially, treating memory
loss. It suggested the possibility of a novel “peripheral sink” (DeMattos et al. 2001,
8854) approach to the treatment of what the patent described as “conditions related
to the Aβ peptide.”As this suggests, m266 is inextricably entangled with the claims
and promise of the ACH – and indeed, the paper reporting the antibody’s efﬁcacy in
mice started by recapitulating the hypothesis. However, as a contemporaneous
review by Harvard neurologist Dennis Selkoe (2001) concluded, such drugs
were also the missing piece in demonstrating the validity of the aetiological picture.
Six years after Hardy and Duff’s celebration of the success of PDAPP mouse
models in demonstrating the ACH, Selkoe positioned the launch of the ﬁrst
amyloid-focussed drug trials as simultaneously a test of the drugs and the hypoth-
esis itself. However, as the story of solanezumab over the subsequent period shows,
conducting this test has resulted in a continual realignment of drug and disease, and
notably the relationship between the rare genetic forms of disease biologically reca-
pitulated through animal models and the sporadic forms on which the large-scale
social and ﬁnancial promise of drug development rests.
From mouse to human
The establishment of “good enough” mouse model of AD enabled the expanded
study of genetic forms of Alzheimer’s disease, while the model itself became
black-boxed as a research tool (cf Nelson 2018) supporting the potential of
m266.2. However, although the ﬁrst successes in monoclonal antibody drugs
came through the direct use of murine antibodies, most such molecules failed to
translate directly into humans (Marks 2015). By the 1990s, the emphasis shifted
to the development of “chimeric” and “humanized” antibodies, genetically reengi-
neered forms with reduced immunogenicity primarily produced in mammalian cell
cultures. Having thus “murinized” (a version of) Alzheimer’s disease, human trials
involved the “humanized” antibody – now named LY2062430 or solanezumab.
The ﬁrst human clinical trials of solanezumab began in 2004, with Phase I trials
conducted with people with mild to moderate dementia, with neat symmetry, at
Indiana University (Siemers et al. 2010). This single site study with 20 people
established the safety and tolerability of the drug in a human population, and pro-
vided the basis for an extension to a Phase II study, this time with 52 people across
6 sites (Farlow et al. 2012). The Phase II study completed in 2008, and Lilly
immediately launched two large phase III studies. These studies, EXPEDITION
and EXPEDITION2 – recruited a total of over 2000 people with mild-to-moderate
Alzheimer’s disease as deﬁned by the McKhann criteria. The studies were con-
ducted at 211 sites across 16 countries – the majority in North America and
Europe, but also Brazil, Argentina, Poland, Russia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Aus-
tralia, reﬂecting the global extension and geographical scaling of the solanezumab
program (Henley et al. 2015). The conclusions from these studies were released in
2013, with the subsequent publication concluding bluntly that solanezumab “failed
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to improve cognition or functional ability” (Doody et al. 2014). Nevertheless,
analysis of a subgroup of people with mild dementia suggested some effect on cog-
nitive performance. It was also found that around 25% of the population diagnosed
with Alzheimer’s disease in each trial were “amyloid negative” (Karran and Hardy
2014). According to the revised diagnostic criteria discussed above (and in contrast
to the McKhann criteria used for recruitment) they no longer fell within the Alzhei-
mer’s disease population.
These ﬁndings formed the basis for the third Phase III trial, EXPEDITION3. To
capture the effect tentatively suggested in the ﬁrst trials, this new study focussed
entirely on people with mild dementia, and who were “amyloid positive.” As intro-
duced earlier, this shifted the diagnostic ground while making this sub-group speak
for the condition as a whole. In other words, it fragmented the common, in a move
familiar within the worlds of “stratiﬁed” and “precision”medicine (cf Tutton 2014).
Nevertheless, as described in the introduction, solanezumab again failed to show a
signiﬁcant effect in this population (Honig et al. 2018).
For sceptics, the results of the EXPEDITION studies, and particularly
EXPEDITION3, cast serious doubts on the validity and value of the amyloid
cascade hypothesis (Le Couteur, Hunter, and Brayne 2016). Nevertheless, as
Lock puts it, “the amyloid hypothesis hangs on, battered and bruised though it
is and remains the key postulate even as prevention moves to the fore” (Lock
2013, 216). Indeed, for proponents, the apparent ability of solanezumab to
affect amyloid levels and the suggestion of possible small changes in cognition
told quite the opposite story. In a 2016 commentary on the 25th anniversary of
the ACH published before the EXPEDITION3 results, Hardy and Dennis Selkoe
drew on the ﬁrst two EXPEDITION studies, an unsuccessful trial of another
MAb, crenezumab, and Phase I trial data from a further drug aducanumab.
Reading from the secondary analysis of EXPEDITION and EXPEDITION2
which drove the launch of EXPEDITION3, they described “a probable signal
in mild AD,” and reiterated the need to move “earlier” in the disease (Selkoe
and Hardy 2016). Similarly, in his comments to the CTAD symposium on
EXPEDITION3, Paul Aisen, the head of the NIA Alzheimer Disease Cooperative
Study argued that “we have a negative study that conﬁrms a beneﬁcial treatment”
and which was “not the refutation of the amyloid hypothesis, it’s the conﬁr-
mation of the amyloid hypothesis – the strongest evidence we have to date”
(author notes). For Aisen also, EXPEDITION3 supported a continuing move
to intervene earlier.
From people to genes to people
The failure of solanezumab, and of the ﬁeld in general to develop a disease mod-
ifying drug has been narrated as a problem of doing too little, too late in the disease
process, and in terms of the limitations of animal models such as PDAPP to provide
a solid basis for therapeutic scaling. As pharmaceutical company researcher Hans
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Mobius set out in a reﬂection on the prevalence of negative results in Alzheimer’s
disease clinical trials, animal models are central to this problem:
To date, there have been more than 200 clinical development failures for various
reasons and all completed Phase III trials on disease modifying compounds in AD
during the past decade have failed to demonstrate a cognitive or clinically relevant
improvement. Of even greater concern are the discrepancies between the positive
results seen in animal models, e.g. removal of brain amyloid and failure to show
beneﬁt in clinical trials when targeting the same mechanism. Despite major invest-
ments and increased understanding of pathophysiology, proof of disease modiﬁcation
remains elusive today. (Möbius 2013)
For Mobius at least, existing animal models were no longer “good enough” for their
purpose, as the geographies of corporeal equivalence between animal and human
manifestations of Alzheimer’s disease start to fragment:
There are no animal models of AD that meet all human disease criteria—so there is
no actual model of AD. (Möbius 2013; emphasis added)
Similarly, at the agenda-setting 2012 National Institutes of Health/National Institute
on Aging “Alzheimer’s Disease Research Summit,” one contributor suggested that
“we need to ask, what have we actually been testing in our preclinical animal
studies?” (Greenberg in NIH 2012, no page). The move to focus on earlier
disease stages and disregard animal models delimits the space of failure within
the research system, to the space of the relations between species and scales, and
temporally, to the stage of disease. Potential success then lies in reconﬁguring
relationships of equivalence and engaging with new temporalities of Alzheimer’s
disease, notably through the ability to predict and pre-empt.
The focus on prediction and pre-emption repositions genetics at the heart of bio-
technological promise – not as genomic technology, but as a “pre-genomic”
biology which is predictable, potentially more amenable to control, and human.
This is captured in the “third wave” of Phase III trials of solanezumab. Where
the ﬁrst (EXPEDITION1 and EXPEDITION2) and second wave (EXPEDITION3)
of trials edged back towards the earliest symptoms of dementia, ongoing trials
move into the realm of prediction and “secondary prevention” (Carrillo et al. 2013).
Here I turn to ﬁeldnotes from a second Alzheimer’s conference, held in London
in the summer of 2017. The notes derive from a satellite meeting to the main con-
ference, sponsored by a leading pharmaceutical company and held in the evening in
the basement of a city-centre hotel. Such meetings provide conference attendees a
means of hearing in a smaller setting from some of major names in the ﬁeld, and
provide a venue for such leaders in the ﬁeld – and companies – to stake claims
to the future direction of Alzheimer’s disease research.
The ﬁrst speakers set out the rationale, and current knowledge related to the pre-
vention of Alzheimer’s disease dementia. Bruno Dubois, professor of neurology in
Paris, describes his work proposing revisions to diagnostic criteria for Alzheimer’s
disease. The second speaker, Colin Masters, contributed to much of the early work
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on both the molecular genetics of Alzheimer’s disease and the ACH, and now leads
a major brain imaging initiative in Australia. Together, they orient and frame the
current state of research and outline the relationship between biomarkers, trials
and the future clinic.
The other speakers present their respective leadership of the two remaining
Phase III clinical trials of solanezumab. Reisa Sperling, who led the NIA-AA
group to develop criteria for research in “preclinical” Alzheimer’s disease,
describes the Anti-Amyloid in Asymptomatic Alzheimer’s disease trial (A4), a
partnership between the US National Institute of Ageing and the pharmaceutical
company Eli Lilly. The A4 study extends the approach adopted in EXPEDITION3.
However, rather than supplementing cognitive symptoms with biological measures
as criteria for trial inclusion, it replaces them entirely – the trial recruits only people
without cognitive complaints but who are “amyloid positive.” The fourth speaker,
Randall Bateman, leads the “trials unit” of the Dominantly Inherited Alzheimer’s
disease Network, or DIAN. DIAN is an international network of families affected
by familial forms of disease. Like A4, DIAN is a public-private partnership of the
type which dominates the Alzheimer’s research ecosystem, supported by govern-
ments through programs like the US National Alzheimer’s Plan Act (NAPA) or
the EU Innovative Medicines Initiative (Milne 2018).
Bateman describes a second trial occurring alongside the A4 study of “asympto-
matic” individuals, the DIAN trials unit (DIAN-TU) study with people with “pre-
symptomatic” Alzheimer’s disease. In the ground of this delicate lexical distinction
between the two studies lies a key boundary between sporadic, late onsetAlzheimer’s
disease and the familial, early-onset form, and the source of scientiﬁc and economic
promise. DIAN-TU differs signiﬁcantly from the A4 and EXPEDITION studies,
most notably in order of magnitude. While the latter recruit research subjects in the
thousands, DIAN-TU’s total population is around 300. However, in the move from
asymptomatic to presymptomatic, amyloid biomarkers are re-connected with
genes, and the latter’s association with prediction and control re-emphasized.
Bateman illustrates this by displaying the dominant image of contemporary AD
research, the so-called “Jack curves,” a hypothetical model of biological and cogni-
tive changes associated with Alzheimer’s disease and named for lead author Clifford
Jack. The curves posit a temporal sequence of biological and cognitive processes
prior to the development of dementia – crystallising what the DIAN group elsewhere
refer to as the “pathochronology” of Alzheimer’s disease (Morris et al. 2012, 975).
Bateman showed that the longitudinal study within DIAN had provided empiri-
cal data to illustrate the hypothetical sequence. He set out the importance of this
data in a co-authored editorial published shortly before the conference, echoing
Mann’s discussion of the predictability of genetic conditions to argue that such
research “provides researchers with a suite of biomarkers to test the efﬁcacy of
treatments after three to ﬁve years.” Critically, the authors continue, “that’s a
time frame that is likely to be palatable to those funding trials such as pharma-
ceutical companies” (McDade and Bateman 2017, 154). As discussed elsewhere,
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Alzheimer’s disease research is continually forced to grapple with the problematic
temporalities of ageing (Lock 2013; Milne 2016). For researchers and companies,
studies such as DIAN-TU offer the potential to save both time and money. Bate-
man’s description mobilizes a genetic imaginary which emphasizes the ability of
genetic knowledge to make Alzheimer’s disease manageable, and as he continues,
to be scaled:
[E]ven for people with different mutations (230 are known), amyloid plaques are a
common target to focus on — one that is shared with the much more common
late-onset Alzheimer’s disease. (McDade and Bateman 2017, 155)
The paper positions amyloid as the pivot between rare and common forms of
disease, and establishes the promise of research in the former in relation to the
latter. It reﬂects the persistence of an imaginary of genetic promise that has conti-
nuities with 1980s molecular biology.
Further, while Bateman’s framing presents the value of genetic forms of AD in
terms of shared pathology, a second position emphasizes the “translational” role
of this population, as described by two clinical triallists:
The conundrum is that we use transgenic animal models based on the amyloid
hypothesis to test compounds for efﬁcacy, and subsequently we exclude the patients
whose pathomechanism is closest to the model organism, in which it is most likely
that the observed effect is replicated. (Szigeti and Doody 2011, 3)
This article, co-authored by Rachelle Doody, a lead investigator on the
EXPEDITION solanezumab trials, is a call for greater inclusion of people with
early onset and genetic forms of Alzheimer’s disease in clinical trials. It reﬂects
the fact that, over much of the last 30 years, familial forms of Alzheimer’s
disease have received comparatively little therapeutic study. Clinical trials fre-
quently exclude people with dominantly inherited forms of disease – primarily
through inclusion criteria that restrict study entry by age. In their discussion,
Skigeti and Doody draw attention to the inconsistency in this approach, given
the basis of animal models in genetic forms of disease, and, we can add, the
basis of drug development in these animal models.
Autosomal dominant forms of Alzheimer’s disease are thus positioned by research-
ers working on both familial and sporadic disease, and by regulators, as an increas-
ingly important locus of drug development. This represents however, a
recalibration of the relationship between familial and sporadic disease, or the
rare and the common. Over the past 25 years, biological understandings of Alzhei-
mer’s disease gleaned from genetic mutations have proved repeatedly resistant to
manoeuvres to scale them into the wider population with dementia. The focus on
amyloid provides a mechanism for aligning and bridging disease scales.
However, it has consequences for the rare disease – drawn more closely into the
orbit of the common – and the common disease, deﬁned in terms that most
closely associated it with the rare.
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Geneticization, calibration and translation
I have argued that the role of genetics in Alzheimer’s disease drug development
suggests the continuing importance of a genetic imaginary in shaping the future
of research and therapy for the condition. This imaginary underpins the amyloid
model that continues to dominate drug development, and shapes the contours of
the relationship between forms of disease that are considered as rare and
common. In doing so, it provides the basis for the promise of scale. I have described
an epistemological and ontological transition from the focus on molecular genetics
as the etymon of disease, through the development of mouse models to the common
and complex. Through these processes, the imagined potential of genetics for drug
development in AD emerges from its ability to establish the molecule and the popu-
lation as scales which are biologically, but also economically, complementary, and
between which concepts and objects such as drugs can move.
The relationship described between the scales associated with rare and common
forms of Alzheimer’s disease as they are constructed around solanezumab has rel-
evance for other domains, including those presented as analogical referents. It suggests
that discussion of the genetic imaginary (Weiner et al. 2017), can be extended by con-
sidering how this imaginary represents a structuring framework for a process of trans-
lation and scaling throughwhich the rare speaks for the common, and which provides
the route to realizing the economic and social potential of genomics.
Scaling genetic understandings through the materials and bodies of biomedical
translation, however, privileges those elements of a system that are most amenable
or least resistant (cf Tsing 2012). Such elements consequently move to become
central nosological as well as aetiological features of disease, as Alzheimer’s
disease comes to be considered in terms of its proteins rather than its symptoms.
Moreover, the relations of scale and equivalence established around pivot points
such as amyloid require constant maintenance and re-assembly. This work of exten-
sion, maintenance and calibration (Lewis et al. 2013) establishes the parameters of
what constitutes “good enough” relationships, not only between human disease and
animal models, but between forms of human disease. As introduced above, work on
cholinesterase inhibitors was based on the apparent transportability of knowledge
from equivalent research on Parkinson’s disease. It involved an essentially analogi-
cal relationship which posited that the two diseases corresponded in important mol-
ecular aspects. In a sense, this represents a classic ANT translation, that is the
creation of “convergences and homologies by relating things that were previously
different” (Callon 1980, 211). As Knorr pointed out in an early analysis of analogi-
cal reasoning in science, such “creative extension[s] of knowledge” are important in
establishing “the promise of success” (1980, 37). However, as she continued, the
instability of such relationships means that “much of… scientists’ work goes into
demonstrating why and to what degree some object is or is not an instance of a
certain kind” (Knorr 1980, 29), identifying and extending interpretations, demon-
strating their relevance and producing and reproducing the conceptual and material
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similarities through which extensions are stabilized. Thus, despite a long practical
history of working with rare and common forms of Alzheimer’s disease together,
the relationship between genetic and sporadic disease captured in the ACH has
required repeated re-iteration and maintenance – a process that John Hardy
described in frustration as like Procol Harum being repeatedly asked to sing “A
Whiter Shade of Pale” (Hardy 2006, 152). However, Knorr’s conclusions about
the limits of such relationships suggest the problems of the translation and
scaling associated with the ACH. Critically, Knorr suggests, the projects and deﬁ-
nitions of success associated with such maintained relationships involve:
[A] path of knowndestination onwhich they have a good chance to arrive at their goals,
and on which they have a good chance to arrive there ﬁrst or fastest. (Knorr 1980, 40)
Consequently, she continues “[a]nalogical transfers form a ﬁrm ground for con-
trolled rather than uncontrolled risks” (Knorr 1980, 40). Similarly, Callon describes
how the building of convergences and homologies both deﬁnes and delimits “the
identity of actors, the possibility of interaction and the margins of manoeuvre”
(Callon 1984, 203). Such solutions do not open the possibility of surprise – in
the terms introduced by Shostak et al. above, they create a form of path dependency
which provides “conservative” (Knorr 1980) strategies and results in the solidiﬁca-
tion or “petriﬁcation” of what counts as true. By basing drug development on a
model constructed around relationships between the rare and the common, research
follows a path of least resistance in order to establish a promise at scale. In contrast,
following Tsing (2012), in “salvaging” therapeutic research into Alzheimer’
disease there may be value in pursuing the sites at which resistance to scaling
occurs, and at which convergence and homology collapse.
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Note
1. Not least geneticist Richard Pratt, who commented at the meeting that “[t]he closer one gets to the
gene -and that means on the biochemical level – the more likely one is to get the right answer”
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